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ABSTRACT 
Today many developing countries fear that regional movements in other parts of the 
world will adversely impact their trade as regionalism overtakes multilateralism. The 
response has been that most of them are trying to get into one regional bloc or the other 
via regional trade arrangements (RTAs).  In this paper we have investigated how India as 
a non-member country is affected by formation of RTAs like ASEAN, EU, NAFTA, and 
MERCOSUR..Controlling for non-RTA factors that influence exports, we find that.   
India’s exports to these RTAs seem to be affected not by the formation of these RTAs per 
se but by demand side factors. 
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As is now well known, Article XXIV of GATT was formulated with the objective 
of  promoting  regional  free  trade  arrangements  (RTAs)  or,  at  least,  not  excluding 
countries which were already part of existing preferential trade arrangements. Examples 
like Benelux and the European Economic Community come readily to mind. Since these 
are obvious violations of the MFN clause underlying GATT, some exception to allow for 
such arrangements was necessary. However the stipulation in Article XXIV that members 
of  such  RTAs  could  not  raise  their  tariffs  above  pre-RTA  levels  ensured  that 
multilateralism could proceed apace.  
The logic of Article XXIV must then lie in the international political economy of 
trade liberalisation. As the theory of second best tells us (see, for example, Lipsey and 
Lancaster (1956-57), Lipsey (1957), Meade (1955)) it is not possible to argue that limited 
free trade is better than no trade though both are inferior to multilateral free trade. In 
other words, the case for Article XXIV must rest on the ground that a series of smaller 
regional movements may pave the way for multilateral free trade. More importantly, for 
many countries RTAs are a method of locking in free trade policy reforms which are 
difficult to sell politically at the multilateral level. To that extent, it can be argued that 
regionalism helps multilateralism rather than act as a stumbling block. 
The welfare arguments of RTAs rest on Viner’s well known distinction between 
trade creating and trade diverting custom unions (see, Viner, 1950). More generally, if 
                                                 
1  We are grateful to two anonymous referees whose suggestions greatly improved the original version of 
this paper. The errors of course remain ours.   4 
efficiency driven trade creation within an RTA is larger than similar trade diverted from 
the  non-RTA  countries  (who  face  a  tariff  disadvantage  vis  a  vis  the  RTA  member 
countries) then an RTA could be welfare increasing for the RTA as a whole. This itself is 
questioned by some authors (see, Lipsey, 1958). In any case, the welfare arguments in the 
Viner tradition are obviously a function of the tariff levels: the higher the tariff levels in 
the world prior to the RTA the greater the likely Vinerian benefits of an  RTA (see, 
Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996).  
Yet, the history of RTAs reveals something different. The highest tariffs on world 
trade were in the period 1950-75 with world tariffs dropping in most of the developed 
countries after 1980 or so (see, Bhagwati, 1992). In fact, by 1990, world tariffs were 
lower than ever before in the period after the Great Depression. Hence, one should have 
seen most RTA agreements taking place during the period of high tariffs. In fact, the 
explosion of RTAs came after 1990 or so and during the build up to the Uruguay round 
(UR) agreement of 1995. According to the World Bank report on ‘Global Economic 
Prospects’ (2005), around 230 new RTAs have been notified to WTO since 1990 to late 
2004.. What is even more interesting is that over seventy percent of these RTAs involved 
some developing country and nearly 40 percent of global trade is taking place between 
partners. Many developing countries were members of more than one RTA and some 
RTAs involved only developing countries.  
It must be remembered that prior to the UR, the ‘non-reciprocity clause’ made it 
unnecessary for developing countries to worry about tariff negotiations under the GATT. 
The non-reciprocity clause, introduced as a concession to the less developed countries 
(LDCs) during the Tokyo round of trade negotiations in the late 1970s, exempted LDCs   5 
from offering reciprocal tariff cuts in response to tariff cuts effected by the developed 
countries (DCs). However, the ‘single undertaking’ of the UR ended this reciprocity. This 
clause, introduced during the UR negotiations of 1995, required that a country signatory 
to any agreement was automatically committed to all agreements signed under the WTO 
irrespective of whether that country was signatory to all or only specific agreements.(for 
some details see, Pant, 2002). The consequence was that after 1995, a country could not 
unilaterally opt out of tariff cutting agreements and had to make some offers during trade 
negotiations.  
The proliferation of the RTAs after 1990 could thus be a defensive response to 
multilateralism. However, in LDCs in particular with very high tariff levels, tariff cuts as 
part of multilateral agreements could be difficult to sell politically. On the other hand, 
tariff cuts negotiated among similar countries in RTAs could be easier to sell politically 
and be a preparation for impending multilateralism. It is a common article of faith in 
developing countries that reciprocal tariff cut agreements with other developing countries 
does not arouse the same political passions as  similar agreements with DCs.   
. While the political logic for the spate of RTAs after 1990 is not difficult to 
understand, it has also been argued that RTAs are a defensive economic response to 
exclusion  from  other  markets.  This  has,  for  example,  been  the  justification  for  India 
negotiating a whole spate of RTAs in the last few years. This therefore begs the question 
whether an RTA necessarily implies trade exclusion to non-member countries and hence 
necessitates a counter RTA.  Existing literature has  mainly looked at the issue of the 
welfare gains to members of an RTA after formation of a regional grouping. What is   6 
however less studied is what impact an RTA has on the trade of non-member countries. 
This is the question that this paper seeks to address.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of 
the developments of the principal RTAs which impact on India’s trade and India’s own 
initiatives in this regard. Section III deals with a brief literature review of the economic 
impacts of an RTA. This is followed in Section IV by a discussion of the methodology 
used  in  our  analysis,  data  sources  and  our  main  results.  Finally,  some  concluding 
observations are given in Section V.  
II. Overview of RTAs. 
Like many other developing countries, India too has been negotiating RTAs with a large 
number of developing countries and trading blocs. A broad overview of the various RTAs 
India  has  contracted  or  is  in  the  process  of  contracting  is  given  in  Appendix  A.  An 
inspection of Appendix A indicates that the operating RTAs cover most of India’s trading 
partners  in  South  and  South  East  Asia,  Europe,  Latin  America  and  North  America. 
However, as India has been a late starter in this regard, it is also clear that the only RTA 
actually in operation for some time is the bilateral agreement concluded with Sri Lanka. 
Of the rest, only the RTA with ASEAN has seen closure this year with implementation to 
begin from 2009. The SAFTA is now in operation but it accounts for only a small part 
(around 5 percent in the year 2006-07) of India’s total exports. The other operative RTA 
is the CECA with Singapore which was quickly concluded mainly because investment 
and  services  are  of  importance  to  India  while  Singapore  does  not  have  a  significant 
manufacturing  base.  Thus  Singapore’s  principal  exports  to  India  of  Machinery  and   7 
Transport Equipment accounted for only about 5 percent of India’s imports of these items 
in 2006.  
However, for our study what is more important is how the formation of an RTA 
would impact India’s exports if India remained outside of that RTA. For our study we 
have looked at four RTAs: ASEAN, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and EU. Table 1 gives us 
regional share of India’s total exports. The share of India’s total exports to these four 
regions was around 40 percent of its total exports to the world in the year 1985, going 
upto around 55 and 49 percent in the years 1995 and 2006, respectively. As nearly a half 
of India’s total exports go to these four regions, so any policy changes like formation of 
RTAs in these regions might have some impact not only on India’s exports to these 
regions but also India’s total exports to the world. Among the four regions, EU and 
NAFTA accounted for 37.7 percent and 39 percent respectively of India’s total exports in 
the year 1985 and 2005. That means among the four regions, EU and NAFTA are India’s 
major  export  destinations.  For  ASEAN  the  share  of  India’s  total  exports  increased 
significantly  from  2.51  percent  to  10.11  percent  between  1985  and  2005.  For 
MERCOSUR the share is not significant but among four member countries, Brazil had a 
share of around 70 and 83 percent of India’s exports to MERCOSUR in the year 1985 
and  2006  respectively.  This  implies  that  Brazil  alone  accounts  for  a  majority  of 
MERCOSUR’s imports from India.   
Table 1: Share (%) of India’s total exports to different regions. 
Region                       Year ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  1985  1995  2006 
ASEAN  2.51  8.61  9.97 
NAFTA  19.37  18.5  16.23 
EU  18.33  27.47  21.21 
MERCOSUR  0.04  0.45  1.36 
Total  40.26  55.04  48.78   8 
  In addition, each has been in operation for some time allowing us to assess the impact 
on  India  in  an  econometric  model.  Finally,  the  RTAs  range  from  simple  Free  Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) like ASEAN and NAFTA to the full economic integration of the EU 
which has progressed from a customs union to an economic union of member countries 
and hence constitutes the most integrated form any RTA could take. The details of these 
four RTAs are given in Appendix B. 
III. Literature review. 
As we have already noted earlier, the theoretical literature on RTAs has largely 
concentrated on the gains or losses to member countries.  Thus, Viner (1950) initiated the 
concepts of ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ to describe the welfare implication of an 
RTA. In Vinerian framework a union is assumed to be small in terms of its share in world 
trade and unable to impact on international terms of trade through trade creation and trade 
diversion effects of an RTA formation. Therefore formation of an RTA cannot affect the 
rest of the world’s welfare. This implies a non-member countries’ welfare is unaffected 
by the formation of an RTA. Later Meade (1955) extended the Vinerian logic in a more 
general  equilibrium  framework  allowing  for  changes  in  international  terms  of  trade. 
Viner argued that trade creation is welfare improving where as trade diversion is welfare 
reducing. The net result thus remains an empirical question.  However, it was argued by 
Gehrels (1956-57) that the static Vinerian welfare gains or losses do not allow for the 
possibilities of consumption changes after formation of an RTA. Latter Lipsey (1957), 
Kirman (1973), Johnson (1974, 1975) elaborated further whether trade diverting customs 
union may be welfare improving or not for the member countries. In another study which 
deals  more  specifically  with  the  welfare  of  non-member  countries,    Kemp  and  Wan   9 
(1976) showed that under  special circumstances there exist a common external tariff for 
an RTA which keeps the non-members’ welfare unchanged and hence increases world 
welfare unambiguously. Developments in the new theories of trade after 1975 led to new 
possibilities  for  welfare  gains  and  losses  based  on  trade  in  differentiated  goods  and 
monopolistic competition. The implication of these considerations has been discussed by 
Krugman (1979, 1980), Helpman and Krugman (1985).  
Corden (1972) incorporated economies of scale into customs union theory. The 
formation  of  an  RTA  may  affect  non-member  countries  through  supply  side 
improvements. These supply side effects could favourably impact non-member countries 
via price changes and/or provision of new product varieties. There are some additional 
possible gains to non-member countries. For example, mutual recognition of standards 
reduces directly the fixed cost of entering the union’s market, and this cost saving may 
give benefit to non-member firms as well as member firms. In one study, Smith and 
Venables (1991) suggested that a reduction of these fixed costs may directly lead to an 
increase in the market share of non-member firms to the union. However, the theoretical 
literature has in general concentrated on the impact of RTAs on the welfare of member 
countries. 
    Since the theoretical literature is largely inconclusive about the welfare gains of 
RTAs, a large member of authors have tried to empirically test some of the propositions 
that have emerged in the theoretical literature. However, here too most of the literature 
has concentrated on measuring the static gains and losses to member countries. ( see, for 
example,  Aitken  (1973),  Balassa  (1967),  Cernat  (2001),  Coulibali  (2007),  Kandogan 
(2008),  Winters  and  Chang  (2000),  Yeats  (1997)).  Some  studies  which  measure  the   10 
effects of an RTA formation on non-member countries are Cernat, L (2001), Chang and 
Winters (2002), Winters (1997), Winters and Chang (2000).    
To our knowledge there are no studies which capture the effects of an RTA on India’s 
welfare in a case where India is non-member for that RTA. Again there exist a few 
studies which tried to look at the welfare implication of an RTA in the case where India 
is a member country. Kelegama and Mukherji (2007) and Joshi, V. (2008) have tried to 
see the effect of India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement on the intra-regional trade and 
accordingly  the  trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  effects  of  the  formation  of  India-
Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA).  Kelegama and Mukherji (op. cit.) studied 
trade creation and trade diversion of India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement on the basis 
of bilateral trade flows under different categories of products. Sector wise imports and 
exports figures were compared for pre and post India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. 
Joshi, V. (op. cit.) studied trade creation or trade diversion of India-Sri Lanka Free Trade 
Agreement base on method used recently by Romalis (2005). In this case Joshi tried to 
measure  trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  effects  of  India-Sri Lanka  Free  Trade 
Agreement based on comparing the ISLFTA  members’ imports of products from  the 
control  countries  (165  countries  grouped  together  as  control  country  which  are  non-
members  of  ISLFTA)  with  China’s  imports  of  the  same  products  from  these  control 
countries. Some studies on SAFTA are mainly based on measuring ex-post intra-regional 
trade and ex-ante comparative advantage in the SAFTA region. 
IV. Measuring the Impact of RTAs on India. 
While most of the empirical studies measure the effects of RTAs using volume of trade 
as a proxy for welfare; some of the studies measure the impacts on terms of trade and   11 
prices. In our study we are going to employ the first methodology, that is, to measure the 
effects on volume of trade resulting from any RTA formation. 
In our study, we are going to investigate the issue of how India as a non-member country 
has  been  affected  by  the  formation  of  RTAs  like  ASEAN,  EU,  NAFTA,  and 
MERCOSUR. As already noted, the rationale behind considering these four RTAs is that 
India’s exports to these four regions comprise nearly half of India’s total exports to the 
world in 2006 and these four unions are among the major RTAs which have been under 
implementation for some time.   
In this study we are going to use two different methodologies; firstly, the rather simplistic 
Balassa  (1967)  methodology  measuring  ex-post  ‘income  elasticities  of  demand  for 
imports’
2,  where  imports  from  India  by  each  of  the  ASEAN,  EU,  NAFTA,  and 
MERCOSUR are taken for pre and post-integration periods and, secondly, estimating a 
modified gravity model to capture the impacts of the formation of these RTAs on India’s 
exports to the various regions. In the gravity model we are able to control for the effect of 
non-RTA factors on India’s exports. This last factor is the obvious shortcoming of the 
Balassa approach. 
This  rather  simple  approach  rests  on  calculation  of  an  RTA’s  income  elasticities  of 
import demand for some ‘reasonable’ period before and after the formation of an RTA.  
The application to our study gives us the following definition: 
th
j   th
Compound growth rate of Import from India by j region.
Income Elasticity
Compound growth rate of GDP of j  region.
=  
Where j = {ASEAN, NAFTA, EU, MERCOSUR} 
                                                 
2This is typically Balassa’s ‘income elasticity of demand for extra-area import’ (see Balassa, 1967, pp. 5)   12 
Compound growth rate of both imports and GDP have been calculated for pre-integration 
and post-integration periods separately. Each period has been defined as seven years. The 
year of effective implementation of each of ASEAN, EU, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR has 
been taken as the ‘benchmark’ year that separates the two estimating periods for each 
region. This is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Pre-integration and post-integration periods for different RTAs 
RTA 







ASEAN  1992  1985 to1991   1992 to1998 
NAFTA  1994  1987 to 1993   1994 to 2000 
EU  1993  1986 to 1992   1993 to 1999 
MERCOSUR  1991  1984 to 1990   1991 to 1997 
Now the Balassa hypothesis is that if the post-integration ‘income elasticity’ increases 
(decreases)  for  region  j  that  means  j
th
  region’s  imports  from  India  had  increased 
(decreased)  due  to  external  trade  creation  resulting  from  formation  of  j
th
  region. 
Consequently,  the  formation  of  the  RTA  is  considered  favourable  (unfavourable)  to 
India. The Balassa methodology assumes that income elasticities of demand for imports 
would have remained unchanged in the absence of RTA formation. This assumption is 
reasonable if the pre and post integration periods are not too long. We have done the 
exercise at the aggregate level and for ten broad disaggregated commodity categories 
based on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev.1).  Analysis based on 
commodity  categories  gives  us  commodity  specific  trade  diversion  or  external  trade 
creation resulting from any RTA formation.  
  
   13 
Modified Gravity Model Approach: 
The use of the gravity model in investigating the welfare impact of RTAs is now well 
known. (see, Greenaway and Milner, 2002 ). However, as we have noted, our focus in 
this paper is on measuring the impact of various RTAs on a non-member country, India. 
In addition, our focus is on India’s exports to theses regions rather than all bilateral trade 
pairs as in usual gravity model applications. Hence, in the second methodology we have 
used a modified gravity model to measure the impact of any RTA on India’s exports to 
that region controlling for other variables which have some impacts on India’s exports. 
Our purpose of using the gravity model is to overcome an obvious shortcoming of the 
Balassa approach; it does not allow us to ‘control’ for non-RTA factors which affect 
India’s  exports  to  these  regions.  Our  first  modification  to  the  gravity  model  implies 
dropping  the  distance  variable.  Since  our  focus  is  on  time  series  rather  than  cross 
sectional  data  (as  in  most  gravity  model  studies)  the  distance  variable  is  irrelevant. 
Second, rather than working with log variables we have defined variables in ratio form 
which  serves  the  same  purpose  of  reducing  the  impact  of  extreme  values  in  our 
estimation.  
The regression equation obtained for our ‘modified’ gravity model is as follows: 
1 2 3 4
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
j j






a b b b b
+ -
+ +
= + + + + +  
                                                                                  -------------- (A) 
 Where, j is any one region among ASEAN, EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ￿: is one of the 
member country of j
th RTA, t: time period in year comprises both pre-integration and   14 
post-integration periods, W: World, I:  India,
j
it X  :
 Exports from India to i
th country of j
th 
region in the year t,  Wt X : Exports from India to the world in the year t,  It GDP : India’s 
GDP in the year t,  Wt GDP : World’s GDP in the year t, 
j
it GDP : GDP of country ￿ in region 
j, 
j
t RTA :  This  is  dummy  variable  for  RTA.  It  takes  values  1  for  the  years  in  post-
integration  period,  and  values  0  for  the  years  in  pre-integration  period,  and  finally            
: it u   Normally distributed random error term which captures other influences on X .    
    We have normalised the figures for exports and GDPs taking ratios to world totals. 
This  normalization  helps  us  to  reduce  the  severity  of  multicollinearity  within  these 







: The share of India’s exports to i
th country of j
th region to its total exports to the 
world in the year t. This term captures the i
th country’s imports from non-member India 
where i
th country is a member of region j or in other words this is an extra-area import by 
i
th country of j






: Share of India’s GDP to the world GDP. This term captures India’s economic 
capacity to export. This is typically a supply side argument that as any country’s GDP 
increases it is potentially more capable of increasing its production base and therefore 






: Share of i
th country’s GDP to the world GDP. This variable gives a demand side 
specification. As any country’s GDP increases then demand for imports should increase. 
So this value should also have a positive impact on India’s exports. 
j
t RTA : This is a dummy variable for RTA, which captures the effect of j
th region’s RTA 
formation on India’s exports. If the impact of this variable is negative (positive)  on 
India’s exports, that implies a trade diversion (trade creation) for India resulting from the 
formation  of  the  jth  RTA..  Clearly  trade  diversion  harms  India’s  exports,  whereas 
external trade creation benefits India’s exports.  
t:  t is the time trend so that ￿4 measures the trend effect on share of India’s exports to i
th 
country of j
th region to its total exports to the world.              
As our aim is to investigate the region specific RTA effect on India’s exports we have to 
estimate the above mentioned gravity equation (A) for each of regions separately.  
          For ASEAN and EU we have taken the major member countries from each RTA 
for regression analysis since in the case of other countries we either do not have available 
data  for  whole  period  and/or  India’s  exports  to  these  countries  are  negligible.  For 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, we have data for the whole period for every member country. 
The member countries which have been taken to estimate the gravity model for ASEAN 
are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. For EU, gravity equation has been 
estimated considering the following countries; United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, 
France,  Belgium,  and  Italy.  For  NAFTA  and  MERCOSUR  we  have  data  for  all  the 
members of each RTA.             16 
      The data sources our study are United Nation’s COMTRADE database for all kinds 
(aggregate level and 1 digit commodity classifications level SITC Rev.1) of trade data. 
For GDP data for all countries and for all regions we have used International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for October, 2007.  
Model Estimation 
It is first necessary to look at the major commodities imported by each RTA from India. 
The details are shown in Appendix C. If a commodity category holds a significant share 
of  total  imports  from  India  by  a  region,  then trade  diversion  effect  or  external  trade 
creation effect on this commodity is much more important to the policy makers than in 
the case of a commodity which has a negligible share. We have used this information to 
identify those commodities where sectoral results for our estimation have been generated. 
Using  the  methodology  outlined  in  Section  IV  we  have  calculated  Balassa’s 
income  elasticities  of  import  demand  for  the  four  regions  both  for  the  pre  and  post-
integration periods. This is shown in Table 3 below. From an inspection of Table 3, it is 
clear  that  ASEAN’s  post-integration  income  elasticity  declined  to  1.98  from  pre-
integration  income  elasticity  3.63.  For  rest  of  the  regions  post-integration  income 
elasticities increased, for EU it increased to 2.28 from 1.53, for NAFTA it increased 
slightly to 2.08 from 1.64, and for MERCOSUR the income elasticity increased to 3.7 
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Table 3: Income elasticities of demand for imports from India by different 






ASEAN  3.63     (1985-1991)  1.98        (1992-1998) 
NAFTA  1.64     (1987-1993)  2.08        (1994-2000) 
EU  1.53     (1986-1992)  2.28        (1993-1999) 
MERCOSUR  2.86     (1984-1990)  3.70        (1991-1997) 
Note: Range of years of each period in parenthesis. 
     The income elasticities at aggregate level clearly show a decline for ASEAN, which 
indicates there was a possible trade diversion effect of ASEAN on India’s exports. This 
implies India’s exports to ASEAN were adversely affected in the post-integration period 
of ASEAN. For EU, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR the income elasticities increased, thus 
implying an external trade creation in the post-integration periods of these RTAs. So 
India would have been better off due to external trade creation effects. 
In Table 4 we present income elasticities of imports calculated at a disaggregated 
commodity level. We have seen in Table 4 that for ASEAN, food and live animals, crude 
materials & inedible except fuels, chemicals & related products, manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by material, and machinery and transport equipment (i.e. Product codes: 
0, 2, 5, 6, and 7) are the major exportable commodities with a share of more than 90 
percent of India’s total exports to this region. From Table 4, we see that post-integration 
income elasticities had declined for all these major products. Hence there seems to have 
been trade diversion effects on all major commodities exported from India to ASEAN. 
This result is consistent with our previous estimated income elasticities at the aggregate 
level. Note that there are some commodity categories like beverage and live animals, 
animal  &  vegetable  oils,  fates  &  waxes,  and  miscellaneous  manufactured  article  for   18 
which  income  elasticities  increased  which  imply  that  for  these  products  there  was 
external trade creation in ASEAN.  
In  case  of  EU  we  considered  food  and  live  animals,  manufactured  goods  classified 
chiefly by material, and miscellaneous manufactured articles (Product Codes: 0, 6, and 8) 
accounting for more than 80 percent of India’s total exports to this region. From Table 4, 
it is clear that for all these commodities post-integration elasticities declined. But at the 
aggregate level the overall income elasticity had increased. So our commodity wise break 
up of income elasticity give results which contradict what we obtained at the aggregate 
level. We think more useful conclusions can be reached if the data are appropriately 
disaggregated. 
Next,  for NAFTA food and live animals, manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by material, and miscellaneous manufactured articles (Product Codes: 0, 6, and 8) are the 
major export commodities with a share of more than 80 percent of India’s total exports to 
this region. It should be noted that product code 6 accounted for almost fifty percent of 
India’s total exports to NAFTA. For this product income elasticity increased to 5.29 from 
4.98. For the other two products, namely, product codes: 0 and 8, income elasticities 
declined. Hence no unambiguous trade creation or trade diversion can be inferred.  
Finally, for MERCOSUR, Product Codes: 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 accounted for more 
than 90 percent of India’s exports to this region. Inspection of Table 4 indicates some 
mixed results. We see that for product code 2 and 7, income elasticities increased and for 
product  codes  5,  6,  and  8  income  elasticities  declined  in  the  post  integration  period. 
Hence no unambiguous trade creation or trade diversion can be inferred.     
   19 
Table  4:  Commodity  wise  Income  elasticities  of  demand  for  imports  from  India  by  ASEAN,  EU,  NAFTA,  and 
MERCOSUR. 
      ASEAN  EU  NAFTA  MERCOSUR 
Commodity 
Code (SITC 

























0  Food and live animals  7.53  -0.31  8.05  1.74  4.11  3.73  18.55  -1.23 
1  Beverages and tobacco  8.17  14.09  8.62  7.35  12.19  18.13  NA  NA 
2 
Crude materials, inedible 
except fuels  8.48  -1.38  7.16  3.09  -0.45  5.98  -0.69  18.54 
3 
Mineral  fuels,  lubricants 
and related  materials  NA  -7.61  NA  -2.24  NA  60.31  NA  NA 
4 
Animal  and  vegetable 
oils, fates and waxes  -10.47  17.84  14.22  7.81  63  6.34  NA  NA 
5 
Chemicals  and  related 
products  11.74  5.08  20.37  5.74  17.34  7.78  34.85  12.61 
6 
Manufactured  goods 
classified  chiefly  by 
material  8.2  -0.26  11.07  2.84  4.98  5.3  10.95  9.78 
7 
Machinery  and  transport 
equipment  6.07  0.97  19.5  7.42  14.11  8.36  4.68  9.9 
8 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles  7.95  9.67  13.1  2.91  8.25  5.27  12.47  9.39 
9 
Commodities  and 
transactions not classified 
elsewhere in the SITC  16.69  11.9  28.6  5.26  4.61  6.87  31.49  12.6   20 
  As already mentioned, the Balassa methodology using income elasticities does 
not control for non-RTA factors that impact trade. In addition, our earlier results show 
that the conclusion are ambiguous and vary from commodity to commodity. We have 
tried to control for non-RTA factors using the regression model given in equation A.  
    The current data available for pre and post integration phases gives us a limited 
number of data points. One way to enlarge our data set and obtain a comprehensive 
estimation of A is to estimate our model for all RTAs taken together. However, such a 
panel data estimation will need to test for both country and region specific effects. The 
issue  is  whether  there  are  country  and  /or  region  specific  peculiarities  which  justify 
estimation of a fixed or random effect model ( see, Cheng and Wall (2005)). The results 
of our estimation are shown in Table 5 below. Column 1 in the Table 5 shows the pooled 
cross-section regression results vis a vis the ‘random-effect’ panel estimation results in 
column 2 and 3 for all RTAs taken together. 
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Table 5: Panel Estimation of Modified Gravity Equation 














Random Effects Panel  
Regression on the Cross 
Section of 17 Countries 
Over 10 Years (5 Years 
pre-RTA and 5 Years 
Post RTA)  
(3) 
Random Effects Panel 
Regression on the Cross 
Section of  4 Regions 
Over 10 Years (5 Years 
pre-RTA and 5 Years 
Post RTA) 


















t RTA   .0004  .003  .003 
t  -.00008  -.0004  -.001 
R Squared  .874 
Within  = 0.078 
Between = 0.907 
Overall = 0.878 
Within  = 0.873 
Between = 0.92 
Overall = 0.878 
 












Observations  221  170  170 
Hausman Fixed 
Ho:  difference in 
coefficients not systematic.                  
chi2(4) = 0.00
 
Prob>chi2 =  1.000 
Ho:  difference in 
coefficients not 
systematic.                  
chi2(4) = 2.11 
Prob>chi2 =  0.716 
                   Note: ** denote significance at 5 percent level.   22 
 
In estimating the results given in Table 5 we have confirmed that the Hausmann test 
statistic indicates that there is no heterogeneity among the countries or regions and hence 
the random effects model is appropriate. The two panel regressions in Columns 2 and 3 
have been run to test for both counry and region specific fixed effects. As the last row of 
table 5 indicates, there are no region or country specific effects. . 
Inspection of Table 5 clearly indicates that the formation of the RTAs themselves has had 
no impact on India’s exports to these regions: the coefficient of the RTA dummy variable 
is  statistically  insignificant.  In  fact  the  only  variable  that  significantly  impact  India’s 
exports to these regions is the demand factor represented by the GDP of a partner country 






 is positive and statistically 
significant. In other words, what drives India’s exports is how a country’s GDP’s behaves 
rather than whether or not a country is part of any RTA. Our results also show that there 
are no significant supply constraints on India’s exports.   
However, it is also useful to estimate equation A as an ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) separately for each RTA to see how demand expansion has impacted 






 in Table 5 is a weighted 
average  of  that  for  the  various  regions  it  could  hide  some  regional/country  specific 
differences. The final results of our estimation are shown in Table 6 below. 
   In Table 6, equation A is estimated for each region separately using standard 
OLS techniques based on pooled cross section data.  
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Table 6: OLS Estimation of Modified Gravity Equations  









(1)    
ASEAN 
(2)             
EU 





















  .752**  .077** 
j
t RTA    0.003  -.001  .007  .0004 
t  0.0007  -.00006  -.001  .0001** 
 
Adjusted R squared  0.43  .23  .95  .72 
F statistics 
F (4, 43)     
= 10.15**
 
F (4, 79)     
= 7.28** 
F (4, 28)      
= 169.8** 
F (4, 51)             
= 37.65** 
Number of 
observation  48  84  33  56 
Note: *, ** denote significance at 10 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. 
 
From the estimation results we can draw the following findings specified for each 
region:   24 






 has a statistically 
significant  negative  sign  which  means  as  ASEAN’s  GDP  relative  to  world  GDP 
increased then its imports from India decreased. This result is consistent with another 
study
3 where ASEAN’s extra-regional imports decreased in the post-integration period. If 
we compare the results of Balassa’s income elasticity approach with our modified gravity 
model, for ASEAN, then we can argue that the decrease in income elasticity of ASEAN 






 (demand constraints) rather than trade 
diversion due to formation of ASEAN. Our results thus indicate that India’s exports are 
losing competitiveness in the ASEAN market. In the absence of price information, we 
could infer that Indian exports are considered inferior goods in the ASEAN markets so 
that their demand falls with income. However, further study on price competiveness is 
essential for any firm conclusions. 
As can be seen from columns (2) to (4) of Table 6 for EU, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR 






 has a significantly positive sign. This implies that as 
the  GDPs  of  these  regions  relative  to  world  GDP  increased,  India’s  exports  to these 
regions  increased.  This  is  quite  reasonable  to  us  as  a  demand  side  argument  that  as 
importer country’s GDP increases then it increases imports from all sources. This is a 
kind of income effect.  
In general, as can be seen from columns (1) to (4) of Table 6 none of the RTA dummies 
are statistically significant. This implies that for all the regions, formation of an RTA, per 
                                                 
3 Cernat, Lucian (2001), ‘Assessing Regional Trade Arrangements: are South-South RTAs more Trade 
Diverting’, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series, No. 16. pp.9.    25 
se, had no impact on India’s exports. This conclusion has already been seen in the results 
of panel estimation shown in Table 5.  





 , which measures the impact of India’s GDP relative to world 
GDP on India’s exports to these regions, is seen to be positive and statistically significant 
only for MERCOSUR. This seems to indicate that exports to these countries, being of 
recent origin are supply constrained and determined by availability of an export surplus 
unlike in the case of traditional markets like the US, EU or ASEAN where supply lines 
are already in place. 
V. Conclusion. 
  Particularly in the last decade, there has been a proliferation of RTAs globally. 
Many of these are in fact among the developing countries themselves. It may be argued 
that  developing  countries  are  contracting  these  RTAs  in  order  to  avoid  any  trade 
exclusion  effects  of  existing  RTAs.  It  has  thus  been  inferred  that  these  RTAs  are  a 
hindrance to trade multilateralism. On the other hand, tariff reductions in RTAs may be 
politically  easier  to  conclude  and  this  could  be  a  useful  method  of  locking  in  tariff 
reductions in later multilateral negotiations. In addition, getting into some RTA or the 
other may make it politically easier to negotiate at the multilateral level.  
This paper looks at these issues using India as a case study. India has been slower 
than other developing countries in contracting RTAs but has been doing so vigorously in 
the  last  few  years.  The  issue  is  to  what  extent  have  existing  RTAs  affected  India’s 
exports?  Have  the  exclusion  effects  of  major  RTAs  on  India  been  strong  enough  to 
require some defensive response by India? Here the issue is to what extent India’s exports 
to its major trade partners have been affected by the formation of RTAs per se. In other   26 
words, has the formation of RTAs like ASEAN, NAFTA, EU and MERCOSUR had a 
negative impact on India’s exports to any region or is the impact due to supply and/or 
demand factors unrelated to the RTA formation? 
  Using the a regression model to isolate the impact of an RTA per se, we observe 
that India, as a non-member of ASEAN, EU, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR, is not impacted 
by any RTA formation per se. India’s exportability to ASEAN seems to be impacted 
mainly by demand constraints. Thus in the case of all the RTAs except ASEAN, India’s 
exports increased in the post RTA period due to the demand effect of increasing GDPs in 
the member countries. The negative income effect in case of ASEAN, is probably related 
to either the nature of commodity exported and/or lower price competitiveness of India’s 
exports.  However  our  present  study  is  not  designed  to  investigate  these  issues.  In 
addition, our regression results also indicate that supply side positive impacts are only 
observed in the case of MERCOSUR. In conclusion, the defensive response of India to 
RTA formation in other parts of the world do not seen warranted at least on economic 
grounds. In addition, if India’s example is looked at, it would be seen that RTAs have not 
been the stumbling block to multilateralism as often feared. We suggest a more detailed 
study of this at a disaggregated commodity levels and also expansion of the model to 
allow for possible terms of trade effects.   27   28 
 
Appendix A: RTAs involving India (as of 2008) 
Agreement  Status of Implementation  Coverage 
ASEAN-India  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(AIFTA) 
The  ASEAN-India  FTA  (AI-FTA)  is  to 
commence from 1st January, 2009.  
Negotiations  on  AIFTA  free  trade 
agreement (FTA) which will result in 
elimination  of  tariffs  on  80%  of  the 
commodities traded between the two 
sides  by  2015  have  been  formally 
concluded. Under the pact, India and 
ASEAN will eliminate import duties 
on  71%  products  by  December  31, 
2012, and another 9% by 2015. Duties 
on  8-10%  products  presently  in  the 
sensitive  list  will  also  be  brought 
down to 5%.   29 
India-Singapore  Comprehensive 
Economic  Cooperation  Agreement 
(CECA). 
The CECA has become operational with effect 
from 1
st August, 2005.  
Joint Study Group identifies areas of 
increased  economic  engagement 
between  two  countries.  These  areas 
are  FTA  in  goods,  services,  and 
investment. 
Framework Agreement for establishing 
Free Trade between India and Thailand. 
The tariff concessions on 82 items of EHS list 
began in 2004. The tariffs on these items would 
become zero for both sides on 1st September, 
2006.  FTA  in  goods  would  commence  from 
March,  2005.  However,  due  to  difference  of 
opinion on certain issues, this deadline could 
not be met. 
The  Framework  Agreement  covers 
FTA  in  Goods,  Services,  Investment 
and Areas of Economic Cooperation. 
Preferential  Trade  Agreement  (PTA) 
between India and Chile. 
The PTA has been signed in 2006.The PTA has 
come into force in India from November 2007. 
India  has  offered  to  provide  fixed 
tariff preferences ranging from 10% to 
50% on 178 tariff lines at the 8 digit   30 
level to Chile; the latter have offered  
a similar range of tariff preferences on 
296 tariff lines at the 8 digit level. The 
products covered in the mutual offers 
account for more than 90 percent of 
the value of total bilateral trade.  
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-
Sectoral  Technical  and  Economic 
Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was launched 
in December 1997 and has membership 
of  Bangladesh,  India,  Myanmar,  Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal. 
The negotiations are at an advanced stage on 
FTA  in  goods  which  is  scheduled  to  be 
implemented  from  1st  July,  2006.  The 
negotiations on the Agreement on Services & 
Investment have also commenced.  
Six  areas  were  identified  for 
cooperation  in  BIMST-EC,  namely, 
trade  and  investment,  technology, 
transportation  and  communication, 
energy, tourism and fisheries.  
Agreement  on  South  Asia  Free  Trade 
Area (SAFTA). The members are India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
SAFTA has come into force from 1st January, 
2006.    Tariff  reductions  will  take  place  at 
different rates for the least developed members 
The  agreement  had  exclusive 
coverage  of  trade  in  goods  and 
provided  for  gradual  concessions  on   31 
Bhutan,  and  Maldives.  Afghanistan  is 
slated  to  join  the  SAFTA  in  January 
2008. 
(LDMs)  namely  Bangladesh,  Nepal,  Bhutan 
and  Maldives  as  against  the  non-least 
developed  members  (NLDMs)  namely  India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
tariffs  and  non-tariff  measures  in 
various stages. In two years NLDMs 
will  reduce  tariffs  from  the  existing 
levels to a maximum of 20 per cent 
while LDMs will bring them down to 
30%.  In  5  years  NLDMs  will  bring 
down tariffs from 20% to 0-5%, while 
LDMs will do so in 8 years. 
India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement.  Bilateral trade between India and Sri Lanka is 
regulated  by  India-Sri  Lanka  Free  Trade 
Agreement (ISFTA) signed in December 1998 
and operational with effect from March 2000. 
Now, both sides are negotiating on not 
only trade in goods but also on trade 
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Appendix B: Major RTAs for which India is a Non-Member 
Agreement  and  Economic 
Characteristics of the RTA 
Status of Implementation  Coverage 
Association  of  South-East  Asian 
Nations (ASEAN): 
As on 2005, ASEAN’s combined GDP 
was  893  billion  US  dollar,  its  intra-
regional  imports  were  142  billion  US 
dollar  and  extra-regional  imports  were 
441 billion US dollar. ASEAN’s import 
from  India  was  10.4  billion  dollar  in 
2005  and  India’s  export  to  ASEAN 
region was 10.11 percent of India’s total 
ASEAN  initiated  its  free  trade 
agreement called ASEAN Free Trade 
Area  (AFTA)  in  1992.  It  is  now 
working as a free trade area among ten 
member countries. 
As  on  January  1,  2005,  tariffs  on  almost  99 
percent of the products in the inclusion list of 
the ASEAN-6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore,  and 
Thailand) have been reduced to no more than 5 
percent.   More  than  60  percent  of  these 
products have zero tariffs.  The average tariff 
for  ASEAN-6  has  been  brought  down  from 
more than 12 percent when AFTA started to 2 
in  2005.  The  average  Common  Effective   33 
export to the world. 
 
Preferential  Tariff  (CEPT) tariff  rates  for 
products in the inclusion list is approximately 
2.7%  in  2003,  down  from  about  12.76%  in 
1993 at the start of the tariff reduction program. 
Within the CEPT mechanism tariffs on goods 
traded within the ASEAN region should meet a 
40% ASEAN content requirement and expected 
to be reduced to 0 to 5% by the year 2002/2003 
(2006  for  Vietnam,  2008  for  Laos  and 
Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia). 
 
Southern  Common  Market 
(MERCOSUR): 
As on 2005, MERCOSUR’s combined 
GDP  was  1.08  trillion  US  dollar,  its 
The  CECA  has  become  operational 
with effect from 1
st August, 2005.  On 
January  1,  1995,  MERCOSUR 
designated itself as a customs union by 
For  MERCOSUR  CET  covers  85  percent  of 
traded  goods.  In  1999,  most  trade  between 
Brazil  and  Argentina  became  duty-free  under 
the intra-MERCOSUR duty phase out schedule.   34 
intra-regional  imports  were  22  billion 
US  dollar  and  extra-regional  imports 
were  94  billion  US  dollar. 
MERCOSUR’s import from India was 
1.3  billion  dollar  in  2005  and  India’s 
export to MERCOSUR was 1.3 percent 
of India’s total export to the world. 
 
establishing a common external tariff 
(CET).  
In  1999,  most  trade  between  Brazil  and 
Argentina  became  duty-free  under  the  intra-
MERCOSUR duty phase out schedule. In case 
of rules of origin the value content should be 
more  than  40  percent  of  the  free  of  board 
(FOB) export value of the final product and it 
must  be  produced  within  any  of  the  member 
states. 
North  American  Free  Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA): 
As on 2005, NAFTA’s combined GDP 
was  14.3  trillion  US  dollar,  its  intra-
regional  imports  were  809  billion  US 
dollar  and  extra-regional  imports  were 
1510  billion  US  dollar.  NAFTA’s 
Implementation  of  the  North 
American  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(NAFTA) began on Jan. 1, 1994 and 
will complete in 2008.  
Under  NAFTA,  tariffs  on  qualifying  goods 
traded  within  the  NAFTA  countries  became 
duty  free  from  January,  1998.  The  tariffs  on 
virtually all originating goods traded between 
have been eliminated by 2003.    35 
import  from  India  was  18.9  billion 
dollar  in  2005  and  India’s  export  to 
NAFTA  region  was  18.2  percent  of 
India’s total export to the world. 
 
European Union: 
As on 2005, EU’s combined GDP was 
13.6 trillion US dollar, its intra-regional 
imports were 2503 billion US dollar and 
extra-regional imports were 1535 billion 
US dollar. EU’s import from India was 
22.5 billion dollar in 2005 and India’s 
export  to  EU  was  21.78  percent  of 
India’s total export to the world. 
The PTA has been signed in 2006. The 
PTA has come into force in India from 
November 2007. 
India  has  offered  to  provide  fixed  tariff 
preferences ranging from 10% to 50% on 178 
tariff lines at the 8 digit level to Chile; the latter 
have  offered  us  a  similar  range  of  tariff 
preferences  on  296  tariff  lines  at  the  8  digit 
level. The products covered in the mutual offers 
account for more than 90 percent of the value 
of total bilateral trade.  
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Commodity    
ASEAN  EU  NAFTA  MERCOSUR 
1985  1991  1998  1986  1992  1999 1987  1993  2000  1984  1990  1997 
0  Food and live animals  29.28  27.6  24.45  15.41  11.25  9.38  10.24  8.43  6.81  0.56  0.84  0.96 
1  Beverages and tobacco  0.37  0.39  0.79  1.55  1.18  0.91  0.03  0.05  0.16   NA  NA   0.21 
2 
Crude materials, inedible 
except fuels  6.24  6.91  3.82  5.02  3.41  3.58  4.23  2.25  2.11  19.15  1.97  4.55 
3 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related  materials   NA  0.02  0.26   NA  0.06  0.07   NA  0.09  0.02   NA   NA   NA 
4 
Animal and vegetable oils, 
fates and waxes  2.42  0.03  0.49  0.44  0.52  1.19  0.01  0.5  0.38   NA  NA   2.68 
5 
Chemicals and related 
products  6.08  11.32  16.93  3.79  7.02  9.43  1.96  4.89  6.38  9.05  66.74  38.13 
6 
Manufactured goods 
classified chiefly by material  32.49  34.32  29.76  43.06  40.03  37.11 53.79  47.95  42.7  22.93  13.67  18.53   37 
 
7 
Machinery and transport 
equipment  18.14  13.26  12.19  2.32  4.04  7.18  2.07  4.02  6.2  38.92  9.61  20.84 
8 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles  4.59  4.65  8.8  27.66  30.08  28.1  24.14  28.78  31.64  9.29  6.73  13.14 
9 
Commodities and 
transactions not classified 
elsewhere in the SITC  0.4  1.5  2.5  0.75  2.42  3.06  3.53  3.04  3.6  0.07  0.4  0.96   38 
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